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pairment, but also (with one notorious exception) forcefully extended the limits of federal legislative and judicial power. None of this was accomplished with the unanimity that had characterized the best days of Marshall; repeated dissents by true states'-righters like Campbell and Daniel highlighted just how far from that category Taney and most of his colleagues were. At the same time, Taney abandoned Marshall's insistence on writing nearly everything himself; accordingly, we shall examine the judicial product of quite a number of Justices.' 0
I. BEGINNINGS: THE THREE BOMBSHELLS OF 1837
A. New York v. Miln.
As part of a scheme for preventing immigrants from becoming public charges, a New York statute required ship captains to furnish local authorities with a list of all passengers they brought into the state. 1 " Over Story's dissent, the Court held that this requirement did not conflict with Congress' power to regulate foreign commerce. 12 Four Marshall decisions had touched on the negative effects of the commerce clause on state authority, but none had clearly struck down a state law on commerce clause grounds. Gibbons v. Ogden ' 3 had invalidated a state steamboat monopoly; Brown v. Marylandl 4 had set aside a tax on the privilege of selling imported goods in their original package; Worcester v. Georgia 15 had held the state could not prohibit whites from living on the Cherokee Reservation; Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. 16 had allowed the damming of a navigable stream. The first three cases variously intimated that the commerce clause might have a negative effect of its own, but each also recited alternative grounds of decision. In Willson, stressing that no federal statute forbade construction of the dam, Marshall concluded that the law in question could not, "under all the circumstances of the case, be considered as repugnant to the power to regulate commerce in its dormant state." 1 7
All four Justices who wrote in Miln took these precedents quite seriously."' Barbour, a "states-right's Virginian" 1 9 appointed just the year before Miln, wrote for the Court a relatively straightforward opinion leaving open the question whether Congress possessed exclusive authority to regulate commerce. 20 The Court had already acknowledged in Gibbons that the states could constitutionally affect commerce by such exercises of the police power as quarantine and inspection laws; 2 ' the law requiring a passenger list was similarly a police measure designed to protect the welfare qf New Yorkers by keeping down the tax burden.2 -A state had as much right to guard against "the moral pestilence of paupers, vagabonds, and possibly convicts," Barbour added crudely, as against "the physical pestilence" of infected crews and cargo. 23 Thompson's literate concurrence added a citation to Willson, in which Marshall had apparently elevated his police power dictum into a holding.2 Thompson also questionably took Wilson as authority that Congress' power to regulate commerce itself was not exclusive. In dissent, Story agreed that the states could affect commerce by exercising their police powers and seemed to concede that therefore they could exclude paupers. 26 He argued, however, that the passenger list requirement did more than affect commerce: it regulated commerce itself, namely "the conduct of masters, and owners and passengers, in foreign trade." 27 Though the states might pass health laws and other police power measures, said Story, they "cannot make a regulation of commerce, to enforce" them, 28 for Gibbons had settled that Congress had exclusive power to regulate commerce. 29 Gibbons, of course, had settled no such thing. As Thompson pointed out in his concurrence, 30 Gibbons held only that state law must yield when it contradicted a federal statute-Marshall's suggestions about the exclusivity of the commerce power were obiter as well as inconclusive. 3 ' Moreover, Story's position seems inconsistent both with his own concessions about the exclusion of paupers and with Marshall's discussion of quarantine laws in Gibbons. A law excluding paupers or quarantining vessels is no less a regulation of commerce than is a requirement that the master provide a passenger list. Indeed, as Barbour noted, 3 2 the statute in Miln required delivery of the list after the passengers landed, while the quarantine and exclusion laws interrupted transportation itself. If such interruptions are acceptable because they are enacted under the police power label, the list requirement should be THE CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 181 (1837), reprinted in 9 L. Ed.
(1883 ed.).
Baldwin explained that later events had caused him to abandon his "intention" of "a silent concurrence," and that he had also abandoned a plan to publish the opinion "in an appendix" to the official reports. See 9 L. Ed. at 873, 928. It thus is unclear whether Baldwin ever considered the statement an actual concurring opinion. Cf 2 C. HAINES & F. SHERWOOD, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 1835-1864, at 46 n.61 (1957) (statement "accidentally omitted").
Justice Wayne later asserted that Thompson, initially assigned to write for the Court. could not secure the needed majority "on account of some expressions... concerning the power of Congress to regulate commerce." Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 431 (1849) (separate opinion). 
Id at 156.
29. Id at 158. Story also argued the state law was contrary to federal statutes he read as "authorizling]... the introduction of passengers into the country." Id at 158-59. As both Barbour and Thompson noted, however, these statutes seemed remote from the issue: they regulated shipboard safety and required delivery of passenger lists to federal authorities for customs and census purposes. Id at 138, 146.
30. Id-at-145.
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Story stood alone in dissent, but he invoked his departed leader for support. Marshall had heard the arguments before he died and had agreed, said Story, that the New York law fell "directly within the principles established" by Gibbons and Brown v. Maryland. 34 This remarkable breach of the confidentiality of Court deliberations has led at least one commentator to accuse Story of misrepresenting Marshall's position. 35 None of Marshall's other former colleagues stepped up to dispute Story's account, however; more likely, the Chief Justice had begun to regret his broad concessions to the states' police power.
Even if Story was right that Marshall would have joined his dissent in Miln, the majority opinion does not seem to represent the sudden break with Marshall's earlier jurisprudence that Story claimed. On the contrary, the majority seems. to have applied Marshall's own declared principles fairly and accurately to sustain state power in an easy case.
36
B. Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky.
The Bank of Kentucky, a corporation owned and controlled by the state, issued a negotiable instrument payable to the bearer in exchange for Briscoe's promissory note. When the Bank sued to collect on the note, Briscoe defended on grounds of illegal consideration, arguing that the instrument issued by the bank had offended the provision of article I, section 10, that "[n]o State shall. . . emit Bills of Credit." 37 The state courts rejected this argument, and the Supreme Court affirmed, once again over Story's solitary dissent. 38 As in Miln, the Court's opinions dealt largely with precedent. Only 33. One of the weaknesses of Marshall's thesis was that the police power concept was hardly self-defining. The Court made no serious effort in Miln or elsewhere to define it, but even Story's dissent conceded that "poor laws" and the exclusion of paupers were police power measures. Id at 156. contending, among other things, that Min "flatly contradicted the Gibbons opinion which gave federal law priority in case of conflict," but not identifying any conflicting federal law.
37. U.S. CONsT. art. I. § 10, cl. In a sparkling display of scholarship, Story gave numerous examples of early issues of paper that had been denominated "bills of credit" even though they were not legal tender, even though special funds were established for their redemption, even though they were payable to bearer on demand, even though they involved no explicit pledge of government credit, and even though they were acceptable in payment of taxes. 4 ' Experience had shown, he argued, that none of these devices sufficed to prevent depreciation in value, the mischief the bills of credit clause was designed to prevent. 42 Finally, if the state could do through a wholly-owned corporation what it could not do directly, "the prohibition is a dead letter. It is worse than a mockery. '43 Marshall, he noted once again, had agreed that the law in Briscoe was unconstitutional. 44 Responding for the majority, Justice McLean acknowledged that the bills to which the Framers objected had included those payable on demand, chargeable to a fund, or not made legal tender, and that a state could not issue bills of credit indirectly through a corporation. 45 However, he concluded, in contrast to Craig, the bank in Briscoe had issued the instrument on its own credit, not on that of the state. Unlike the state itself, the bank could be sued without its consent, and thus all its assets could be seized to satisfy the obligation. 46 
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The two great infirmities wlich attended the bills of credit which circulated as money, and come within the mischief intended to be guarded against by the constitutional prohibition, were the want of some real and substantial fund being provided for their payment and redemption, and no mode provided for enforcing payment ... , [as the agent who signed the bills] could not. . . be made personally responsible... ; and the State was not suable .... iheir credit depended solely upon the faith and voluntary will of the State; and were therefore purely bills of credit. But that is not the situation or character of the bills of the bank in question. There is an ample fund provided for their redemption, and they are issued by a corporation which can be sued, and payment enforced in the courts of justice. 47 Story answered the majority by arguing that the opportunity to sue the bank was an illusory safeguard because the state could abolish the bank, reclaim its assets, and leave the holders of bank paper without remedy.' 8 The conclusion that such a course would have been constitutional seems hasty: although the bank could hardly object to anything the state might do with its own property, destruction of the bank's ability to pay might well have impaired its contractual obligation to the bill holder in violation of an adjacent clause of article I, section 10. 49 The bills of credit clause is seldom heard of today; its function is now largely supplanted in practice by federal statutes regulating the money supply. 52 
Several commentators have agreed with Story that
Briscoe essentially overruled Craig and cut the heart out of the clause, 53 but I think Briscoe was a hard case in which the opposing opinions deal intelligently with the competing considerations. In 1785 the Massachusetts legislature granted a corporate charter to the proprietors of the Charles River Bridge, authorizing them to construct a bridge between Boston and Charlestown and to collect tolls for a period later extended to seventy years. In 1828 the legislature authorized another company to build a second bridge adjacent to the first, providing that the new bridge would revert to the state and become toll-free after a maximum of six years. The proprietors of the first bridge argued that the act authorizing the second bridge impaired the obligation of their charter in violation of article I, section 10. 55 The state court held it did not, and a divided Supreme Court affirmed.
56
Chief Justice Taney's opinion for the Court-his first in a constitutional case-was brief, lucid, and to the point. Rejecting the natural law notions appearing in such early cases as Calder v. Bull 7 and Fetcher v. Peck, 58 Taney refreshingly insisted the only question was whether the state had promised "not to establish a free bridge at the place where the Warren bridge is erected." '59 Common law precedents established a rule of strict construction for public grants: "'any ambiguity in the terms of the contract, must operate against the adventurers, and in 67 Story argued with impressive historical support that the law had never required strict construction of public grants that were supported by consideration-as in the case before him, where the proprietors had promised to keep the bridge in good repair. 6 8 As Coke and other authorities had established, a charter implied "that the legislature shall not do any act directly to prejudice its own grant, or to destroy its value." 69 The Court had so held in Fletcher v. Peck, 70 where it found that a conveyance of land contained an implicit promise not to retake the property; in the case at hand construction of the second bridge had put an end to toll-paying traffic and destroyed the value of the franchise as effectively as an express This time Story did not say Marshall had agreed with him; and while Swisher reported that he had, C. SWISHER, supra note 10, at 363; see also 2 C. WARREN, supra note 10, at 28, one of the lawyers in the case said he had been "credibly informed" to the contrary. See G. DUNNE, SUpra note 10, at 364 & n.18 (1970); S. KUTLER, supra note 56, at 172-79; see also G. DUNNE, supra note 10, at 360 (questioning whether Story should have recused himself, in view of his teaching position at Harvard University, which was entitled to a share of the tolls).
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HeinOnline --1983 Duke L.J. 482 1983 the basis of more decisions striking down state legislation than any other clause of the Constitution. Many of the cases had no doctrinal significance, and merely applied settled principles to yet another fact situation; the important cases can be discussed in rather short compass.
A. Bronson v. Kinzie.
After Kinzie had mortgaged land to Bronson, the Illinois legislature enacted statutes forbidding foreclosure sales for less than twothirds of market value and giving a mortgagor and his judgment creditors a right to redeem within a year after sale. Over the lone dissent of Justice McLean, the Court held that both laws offended the contract clause.
78
Decided in 1843, Bronson was the first major contract clause case since Charles River Bridge. Chief Justice Taney again wrote for the majority, and again the opinion displayed an economy and lucidity of style coupled with a tendency to rely on precedent. There, however, the resemblance ended: the earlier opinion had given a niggardly interpretation of a charter, but in Bronson, joined by five of his Democratic brethren, 7 9 Taney delivered a ringing affirmation of the contract clause.
In Taney's view, the earlier Illinois law giving the mortgagee an unrestricted right to foreclose "entered into the contract, and formed a part of it, without any express stipulation to that effect in the deed." 80 The later statute extending the right of redemption acted "directly upon the contract itself' by giving the mortgagor and his other creditors "an equitable estate in the premises, which neither of them would have been entitled to under the original contract," and thus impaired the initial obligation. 81 That the other provision requiring a sale price at least two-thirds of the land's value "apparently acts upon the remedy" 82 [Vol. 1983:471 Taney endorsed the Marshall Court's condemnation of acts that "'so change the nature and extent of existing remedies as materially to impair the rights and interests of the owner,'-84 and commendably refused "to sanction a distinction between the right and the remedy, which would render the provision illusive and nugatory." 8 5 The twothirds law in Bronson crossed this forbidden line because "its effect is to deprive the party of his pre-existing right to foreclose the mortgage by a sale of the premises, and to impose upon him conditions which would frequently render any sale altogether impossible."
86
In Charles River Bridge, 8 [N]o one, we presume, would say that there is any substantial difference between a retrospective law declaring a particular contract or class of contracts to be abrogated and void, and one which took away all remedy to enforce them, or encumbered it with conditions that rendered it useless or impracticable to pursue it. 86. Id at 320. In saying all this, Taney, in best Marshall fashion, had gone further than the case required. As he acknowledged, the mortgage in question expressly authorized a foreclosure sale, so the case could have gone off on Justice Washington's narrower ground that when a contractual provision gave the right to a particular remedy, that remedy was a part of the obligation itself. Id at 320-21; see THE SUPREME COURT 1836-1864 ing... payment," or shorten the period of suing on existing contracts, though doing so "bars the right of action. ' 90 "[S]urely," McLean reasoned, "the exercise of the lesser power, by modifying the remedy at discretion, must also be constitutional." 91 Indeed, though McLean did not say so, Marshall had conceded both of his examples in Sturges; and the Court had actually upheld the state's power to abolish debtors' prison retroactively in Mason v. Haile. 92 McLean's attempt to distinguish the Court's best precedent was lame, 93 but Marshall had asked for trouble in Sturges by making such broad concessions about the power to alter remedies. Whether the measures endorsed in Sturges were less intrusive than Illinois's twothirds rule, moreover, Taney did not bother to say. 94 Ninety years later his successors would uphold a law authorizing two-year extensions of a redemption period and suspension of the right to a deficiency judgment; 95 even without this glaring contrast, it is difficult to argue that Bronson was hostile to the contract clause. McLean's analogy to the right of a court applying foreign law to employ its own procedures, id at 329-30, was both intrusive and restrictive; in theory the court was expected not to interfere B. West River Bridge Co. v. Dix.
In 1795 Vermont granted an exclusive one hundred year franchise to build and operate a toll bridge. In 1843 a Vermont county court ordered the bridge taken for public use on payment of $4000. In an 1848 opinion by Justice Daniel, 9 7 over Justice Wayne's dissent, the Supreme Court held that the taking had not constituted an impairment of the bridge company's contract. 98 This result may not seem surprising; not only the state courts cited by Daniel 99 but even the rigid Justice Story had acknowledged that a state could take bridge franchises, like any other property, on payment of just compensation. 100 Yet neither Daniel nor Story gave a satisfactory answer to the crucial question earlier posed by Justice Johnson in his concurrence to Fletcher v. Peck: 101 how could the exercise of emi-.nent domain be reconciled with the Fletcher holding that the state had implicitly promised not to take back the property it had granted?
Vermont's counsel came up with a promising response: the grantor had agreed only that it would not impair the grant, and compensation gave the grantee the equivalent of his original right. 102 There was something to Webster's riposte that compensation was not really the same as the franchise itself; 10 3 the owner might have preferred not to sell his rights, and the traditional availability of specific performance of land contracts suggests the inadequacy of damages in this area. The basis of Fletcher's implied promise, however, was the reasonable expectations of the parties; in these terms a promise not to steal property is much easier to infer than a promise not to buy it at a fair price. In refusing to infer a promise not to tax a corporation, Providence Bank v. Billings 1 04 had shown that a grant did not imply rights superior to those of others similarly situated; and Charles River Bridge had refused to THE SUPREME COURT 1836-1864 infer a promise not to undermine the value of a bridge franchise even without compensation. 0 5
Justice Daniel, however, invoked neither these precedents nor the cogent arguments of counsel. After describing eminent domain (without citation) as an essential attribute of "every sovereign political community,"1o6 he insisted without further explanation that the franchise implicitly provided for its exercise. 0 7 Thus Daniel reached by pure fiat a conclusion he could easily have justified; and, by finding an implicit reservation of the taking power instead of simply declining to find an implied promise not to exercise it, he made the issue look harder than it was.1 0 8
Moreover, the argument that Fletcher's implicit promise not to destroy a grant does not prevent a compensated taking seemed to require an examination into the adequacy of the compensation. Nevertheless, though the franchisee's counsel had argued that the price paid was grossly insufficient,'°9 Daniel expressly declined to undertake that inquhry"O Indeed he never clearly said, though Fletcher would seem to require it, that compensation had to be paid at all. Thus, although the general principle established in West River Bridge appears both reasonable as a matter of contract interpretation and in accord with precedent, the majority opinion gave the states an easy means of circumventing Fletcher v. Peck without even adverting to that decision.
105.
See supra notes 55-77 and accompanying text. 106. Wet River Bridge, 47 U.S. (6 How.) at 531. 107. Despite a general statement that "all private rights" were held subject to the power of eminent domain, id at 532, Daniel did not say the state could not validly promise to waive the exercise of its power. As he saw the case, the state had not attempted to make such a promise. 108. Woodbury, who had replaced Story in 1845, said much the same thing in a concurring opinion, adding unnecessarily that he doubted any necessity could justify taking private property for uses such as marine hospitals and jails. West River Bridge, 47 U.S. (6 How.) at 546. He also said, even less relevantly, that he thought a state could modify at will a contract of employment of a public officer. Id at 548; see infra notes 111-29 and accompanying text (discussing Butler v. Pennsylvania, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 402 (1850)). McLean, as in Charles River Bridge, concurred on the ground that a taking of property was not an impairment of contract. West River Bridge, 47 U.S. (6 How.) at 536-39. Justice Wayne was reported to have "delivered a dissenting opinion," but its contents were not revealed. Id at 549.
109. West River Bridge, 47 U.S. (6 How.) at 513, 520 (placing the value of the franchise at S10.000).
110. Id at 535.
Less than a year after appointing Butler a canal commissioner "for the term of one year" with "all the rights, powers, and emoluments of the said office" under a statute providing a compensation of four dollars per day, the state of Pennsylvania reduced his salary and then replaced him entirely."' The state courts rejected the argument that this conduct had impaired the contractual obligation. 112 In 1851 the Supreme Court affirmed, without dissent on the merits, in another opinion by Justice Daniel. Pennsylvania case law, which Daniel cited,' 14 emphatically denied that public officers enjoyed a contractual relation with the state, and ever since Ogden v. Saunders" 5 the Court had proceeded on the premise that the existence and extent of an obligation depended on the law in effect at the time the obligation allegedly arose. Thus, having checked that the Pennsylvania decisions were not latter-day concoctions to evade the contract clause," 6 the Court could easily have justified its decision on the ground that the governing stite law created no obligation.
Daniel took a broader approach, however, concluding that appointments, of state. officers "do not come within the import of the term contracts" in the Constitution." 7 The contract clause, he said (again without citation), applied only to "contracts by whichpeifect rights, certain dfnite, fixed private rights of property, are vested";' 8 "from the necessity of the case, and according to universal understanding," engagements "undertaken by the body politic or State government for the benefit of all" could be varied at will. 1 19 A contrary holding would be "reconcilable with neither common justice nor common sense"; it would either "arrest necessarily every thing like progress or improve- There is in these passages a strong echo of Marshall's habit of concluding that the Framers have done no wrong. 122 There is the bare assertion that foisting "sinecures" on the public payroll is worse than breaking faith with one's employees. 1 23 There is the unsupported attribution of this same set of values to those who wrote into the Constitution an explicit requirement that the states keep their promises. There is no-attempt to reconcile the broad conclusion that the contract clause is inapplicable to engagements "for the benefit of all" with the Dartmouth College case, which had held that a charter granted to an eleemosynary institution for the public good was protected by the Constitution, 124 or to explain why the canal commissioners in Butler had rights any less "perfect," "definite," "fixed," "vested," or "private" than those of Dartmouth itself. - The Court could have made a respectable effort along this line. Marshall had conceded in Dartmouth that the contract clause did not "restrain the states in the regulation of their civil institutions, adopted for internal government," 125 and even Story had acknowledged that states could abolish municipal corporations. 26 On the other hand, as Justice Washington had explained, in the case of a municipal corporation the state was essentially contracting with itself. 127 Butler, in con-120. Id 121. Id at 417. These last passages confused the basis of the holding by suggesting two grounds distinct from the question of what constituted a "contract" within the meaning of the clause. Daniel's statement that the state's surrender of power to alter an officer's salary "cannot be presumed" seemed to suggest a narrow interpretation of the agreement itself, id; his doubt whether the state could make such a surrender seemed to echo the undeveloped suggestion of both Marshall and Johnson in Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810), that the state constitution might limit the authority of the state government to contract away its sovereign powers. Cf infra notes 130-52 and accompanying text (discussing contractual tax exemptions).
122. 129. Justice Woodbury's opinion the same term for a unanimous Court in Town of East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co., 51 U.S. (10 How.) 511 (1850), provides an interesting contrast to Butler. Woodbury invoked both Washington's and Story's Dartmouth opinions to reach the less controversial conclusion that the state could rescind a ferry right it had granted to a municipal corporation. Id at 536. However, the broad holding of East Har/ord that arrangements between states and their subdivisions lay outside the contract clause was unnecessary in light of the alternative conclusion of estoppel: the city had earlier admitted it held the ferry at legislative pleasure. Id at 537. Woodbury also added both that the legislature had no power to surrender the right to retract its franchises, id at 534-35, and that it had implicitly reserved power to modify the arrangement as public need dictated. Id at 536-37. Both these points seemed equally applicable to grants to private parties, and in that context they appeared to conflict with all the precedents refusing to allow alteration of public grants; but they were both quite unnecessary to the decision. 133. The promise was found in a statute providing that if existing banks would invest in a proposed turnpike and pay an annual sum of twenty cents per hundred dollars of capital stock, "the faith of the state is hereby pledged not to impose any further tax or burden upon them during the continuation of their charters under this act." See Id at 146.
134. Counsel had argued that the exemption would otherwise become worthless. Gordon, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 139. Wayne said the condition that the exemption take effect on acceptance by "the bank" showed the legislature had equated the institution with its owners, since they alone THE SUPREME COURT: 1836-1864 pretation was hardly compelled by clear language; the decision seemed to show that, despite Charles River Bridge, the Taney Court would not always take a restrictive view of promises in public contracts. 135 The major 1854 case of Piqua Branch of State Bank v. Knoop1 36 demonstrated that the Gordon decision was no mere sport.1 37 Ohio had passed a statute authorizing any group of five or more persons to form a banking corporation, requiring any bank so organized to pay the state six percent of its net profits semiannually, and providing that this amount "shall be in lieu of all taxes to which such company, or the stockholders thereof on account of stock owned therein, would otherwise be subject."' 138 The Ohio courts upheld a later statute taxing the capital stock, surplus, and contingent fund of such banks. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by McLean, reversed.
As Campbell pointed out in. a well-written and well-documented dissent joined by Catron and Daniel, 39 the state had not explicitly promised that the taxing arrangement in the 1845 statute would remain unaltered by subsequent legislation.'4 In contrast to the pledge in Gordon to impose no further tax on banks "during the continuance of their charters," the assurance in Piqua, by which the state had only declared that the semiannual payments should be "in lieu of all taxes," could agree to the terms of the bargain. Id at 147-48. Professor Wright termed Wayne's conclusion "very doubtful" B. WRiGHT, supra note 77, at 183.
135. Indeed, Wayne rejected an argument that the exemption applied only to franchise taxes on the ground that the banking franchise itself, unlike land acquired from the state, would have been implicitly exempt in the absence of an express provision: the bank paid a price for the privilege, "and any tax upon it would substantially be an addition to the price." Gordon, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 146. Despite Wayne's disclaimer, this argument would appear equally applicable to every sale of state land, or for that matter to every corporate charter for which there is consideration (though Wayne explicitly denied this application, id at 145-46). This incidental conclusion that bank franchises possessed implicit immunity from taxes seemed not only out of harmony with the principles of construction set forth and applied in Charles River Bridge, but also irreconcilable with The company was not, strictly speaking, a bank, but its charter provided it should be taxed no more heavily than banks. Taney and Grier thought the state had agreed to give the company "the ,benefit of its general regulations and laws... but not of its special contracts" concerning bank 'taxes, id at 441, and the 1845 provision involved in Piqua was a "special contract" applicable only to banks established under its other provisions. 1d at 439. As McLean and Curtis pointed out in separate dissents, id at 444, 450, this seemed a peculiar construction because every bank in the state was subject to the 1845 rate at the time the statute was passed. Once the Court had answered the hard question in Piqua by favoring exemption, the same result should apparently have followed easily in Debolt, but with the votes of Catron, Daniel, and Campbell (who adhered to their position that the banks themselves were taxable at the 1851 rate), the vote in Debolt was five to four against immunity. For further discussion of Debolt, see infra note 147.
143 rejection of what Daniel trmed the "suicidal doctrine" that a legislature could "bind foxver and irrevocably their creator," the "sovereign people." Debolt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) at 443 (Daniel, J., concurring in judgment). Whether this view was consistent with any legislative power to contract he did not say. Taney, joined by Grier, wrote separately to affirm both the power of Ohio's legislature to give irrepealable exemptions and the Court's duty to reexamine the state's interpretation of its original action, while finding no contractual exemption on the facts. Id at Absent some unusual provision in the Ohio constitution-and nobody pointed to one-McLean seemed to have the better of this argument. 1 48 Catron's view would reappear in dissents even on the tax issue, 49 and the Court would later adopt it with respect to alleged promises not to exercise the police 5 o and eminent domain 5 1 powers. During Taney's term, however, the Court not only enforced tax exemptions; it also gave them, on the whole, a reasonably broad construction' 5 2 -despite the contrary philosophy of Charles River Bridge.
E. Gelpcke v. Dubuque.
Pursuant to statutory authorization, the City of Dubuque issued bonds in exchange for shares of railroad stock. The Iowa Supreme Court had held before the bond issue that the authorizing statute was consistent with the state constitution; after the issue, the court reversed itself. In a federal diversity action to recover interest, the Supreme Court disregarded the latest state court decision and held for the bondholders. 1 53
For the Court, Justice Swayne argued that the "settled rule" requiring respect for state court decisions "giving constructions to the laws and constitutions of their own States" 1 54 had been held inapplicable in "exceptional cases,"' 5 5 none of which he had the grace to identify. The earlier Iowa decisions favoring the bonds were "sustained by reason and authority" and "in harmony with the adjudications of sixteen States," and, Swayne noted, "[i]t cannot be expected that this courtwill follow every.., oscillation" in state decisions.' 56 As Taney had said in earlier dicta, a contract valid according to contemporaneous state interpretation "cannot be impaired by any subsequent action of legislation, or decision of its courts altering the construction of the 427,432-33,441. Campbell once again properly found it unnecessary to decide the broader question. lid at 443-44 (separate opinion).
148. See also Hale, supra note 102, at 654. 168 Swayne might have invoked the purpose of the contract clause to protect legitimate expectations, along with a recognition that judges effectively make law by deciding cases. 169 Perhaps his failure to do any of this resulted from an inability to muster a majority for what at the time may have seemed an unwarranted extension; it may be rough justice, if hardly consolation, that the Court gave no better explanation when it later said the clause did not apply to judicial decisions. 170 In any event, though Gelpcke neither clearly expanded the contract clause nor contained any acceptable justification for-its holding, it was certainly npot unfriendly to contract rights.
F. Summary.
The cases considered above make it impossible to conclude that the Court consistently displayed toward the clause the kind of hostility that its crippling construction of the charter in Charles River Bidge appeared to represent. Swayne might also have added that Calder's contrary reading of the ex post facto clause had been assumed rather than explained, and that a limitation on the power to overrule prior contract decisions could more easily be attributed to the Framers than could a prohibition on appeals from inferior courts, which was all that had been involved in Caider. Swayne's later suggestion that to follow state decisions in cases like Geipcke would be to "abdicate one of the most important duties with which this tribunal is charged," Pine Grove, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) at 678, echoes McLean's correct conclusion in Pqua that to give binding effect to state decisions when legislation is attacked would emasculate the contract clause. In Gelcke, however, no legislation was under attack, the issue was the threshold question of whether judicial action could ever offend the clause. Because the case providing Taney's dictum involved an attack on state legislation, and since Taney in the .same breath reaffirmed the point made in Piqua, Miller 
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[Vol. 1983:471 weaken the clause, and the tax exemption cases demonstrate they were sometimes even generous in their interpretation of government promises. After Marshall's refusal to infer a promise not to tax, there was nothing radical about his successors' refusal in West River Bridge to infer a promise not to exercise the ordinary power of condemnation. Even the relatively extreme holding in Butler that contracts for the employment of state officers were not protected had roots in Marshall's dictum exempting purely governmental arrangements and could easily have been justified on the basis of state law. Though the additional decisions not discussed here may confirm a certain inclination toward narrow construction of public promises outside the tax exemption field, they do not seem to alter the picture very significantly. In 1835 and 1836, Slaughter brought slaves into Mississippi and sold them on credit. 173 Some of his customers failed to pay and defended themselves on grounds of illegality: the Mississippi constitution provided that the "introduction of slaves into this state, as merchandise, or for sale, shall be prohibited, from and after the first day of May, [1833] ." 17 4 The trial court rejected this defense, and the Supreme Court, over two dissents, affirmed. McLean, Taney, and Baldwin each published concurring opinions ex-' pressing highly divergent views on the commerce clause issue, which all three conceded did not have to be decided.' 77 Like Story in Mlif, McLean began by inflating Gibbons into a holding that Congress had exclusive power over commerce but concluded that slaves were not articles of commerce 78 because the Constitution referred to them as "persons."' 7 9 Responding persuasively that the clause of article I, section 9 forbidding Congress to outlaw the slave trade before 1808. 174. Id See geiff-ally 5 C. SWISHER, supra note 3, at 366 ("the importation of slaves de-, pressed the market value of those already held in the state" and the slave traders brought in slaves who were "troublemakers or in other respects undesirable"); 2 C. WARREN, supra note 10, at 68 n.l (this was "a financial rather than a slavery measure," designed "to check the drain of capital away from the state"). 
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demonstrated that slaves otherwise fell within the commerce power, 80 Baldwin admitted that a law forbidding-the importation of all slaves could have been sustained under the police power on grounds either of morality or safety, but argued convincingly that the purpose of the Mississippi provision was purely commercial because it forbade only importation for sale.' 81 sippi's constitution was not self-executing, Is4 the quoted paragraph meant the state had power to forbid the importation of slaves for sale.
That Thompson and Wayne joined in this paragraph-rather than resting solely on the former's conclusion that the Mississippi provision had no legal effect-suggests that they could not resist adding their two- THE SUPREME COURT" 1836-1864
cents-worth on the issue Thompson had so carefully and properly avoided. None of the four, however, gave any inkling of a reason for their conclusion.
13 5
Inconclusive as it was on the commerce clause issue, Groves did serve to repudiate Webster's astounding assurance during argument that "all questions" relating to the clause "are now fully settled."' 8 6 Six of the seven participating Justices 8 7 apparently concluded that Mississippi could forbid the importation of slaves for sale; the seventh seemed to suggest it could have excluded slaves entirely. For all but two of them, however, this was only dicta. The three Justices who gave reasons for their decision took three distinct positions. The other four left us to wonder whether they thought such a law valid because the commerce power was not exclusive, because of the police power theory applied in Miln, or because the subject lay wholly outside the commerce clause. 188 For those counting heads in anticipation of the inevitable commerce clause showdown, after Groves four Justices-Johnson, Story, McLean, and Baldwin--had gone on record that Congress had exclusive power, and only Thompson had yet indicated the contrary.
B. License Cases.
Convicted of selling imported liquor without licenses required by state law, the defendants in three separate cases attacked their convictions on constitutional grounds. The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed, 189 but it is difficult to say why. There was no opinion for the Court. Of the seven Justices whose vote was reported, six wrote sepa-,rate opinions; two wrote more than one. 9°1
85.
McKinley apparently delivered an oral opinion whose contents are unknown; Story was absent when the decision was announced. 5 C. SwisHmR, supra note 3, at 367. it could easily have been argued that some federal control over the sale of imported goods was necessary and proper to prevent the effective obstruction of commerce itself.
Groves
Most interesting and important was the argument of at least four Justices that Congress' power over commerce was not exclusive. As Taney and Catron convincingly explained, 98 the Court had never held it was; in contrast to the power to coin money, the Constitution did not say it was, and the Court had held that Congress' comparable powers There was some discussion in the third case of whether the prohibition on state import taxes, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, applied to interstate shipments. Se, e.g., License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 595 (McLean, J.) (denying application despite contrary dictum in Brown). As Catron said, however, the license requirement was not even clearly a tax, for it imposed only a nominal fee to cover administrative costs. Id at 599. In the cases involving foreign liquor the imports clause argument met the same fate as that based on the tariffact: after leaving the hands of the importer, the liquor was no longer an import. See, e.g., id at 577 (Taney, C.J.). THE SUPREME COURT 1836-1864 over bankruptcy and the militia were not. 199 Furthermore, quarantine and pilotage laws showed that states had regulated commerce with congressional blessing ever since 1789, and not because they fell within the "police power"; if federal authority were exclusive, it would be irrelevant whether a state's motive was "to guard the citizens of the State from pestilence and disease" or to promote "the interests and convenience of trade." 2 0°A s usual, Taney's opinion was competent and straightforward. 20 ' Woodbury and Nelson, as well as Catron, agreed with him, 202 and an aside in Daniers opinion also seems to suggest the same conclusion. 20 3 Only McLean, gratuitously repeating his Groves argument, disagreed. 2°4 Grier properly avoided the subject, 205 McKinley was absent, and Wayne apparently did not vote. 206 Thus four of the seven Justices who voted declared flaty and persuasively 2 7 that the commerce clause did not limit state power. It seems unfortunate that Daniel did not express more definitively the similar sentiments he was to utter two years later in a dissent to the Passenger Cases. 20 8 Although DUKE LAW JOURA4L [Vol. 1983:471 the Court in Taney's own time would demonstrate that constitutional precedents enjoyed no immunity from being overruled, 20 9 the License Cases were hardly a precedent at all.
Grier had replaced

C. Passenger Cases.
New York and Massachusetts charged ship captains a fee for every passenger they brought into the state. By a five to four vote in 1849 the Court held these levies invalid. 213. Id at 410-11, 452. Protesting that "a majority" of those voting to strike down the laws "do not think it necessary ... to reaffirm" the exclusivity of federal power, Wayne went right on to reaffirm that it had been established in Gibbons and was the "foundation" of his conclusion. Separate dissents by Taney, Daniel, and Woodbury 2 9 offered three strong responses and one weak one to the exclusivity argument, and as in the License Cases Nelson mercifully joined Taney without explanation. 22° First, Min and other cases had recognized that the states retained their police powers whether or not the commerce power itself was exclusive; because the passenger fees funded the treatment of diseased passengers and the support of indigent aliens, they served the acknowledged police purposes of avoiding the burden of supporting paupers and the introduction of disease. 22 McLean's response that these were revenue rather than police measures 222 recalls Story's losing contention in Miln that a state could not enforce its health laws by regulating commerce; 223 all the other Justices, including McLean, had concluded in Miln that purpose rather than form controlled. Second, the dissenters argued, if form was indeed the test, the passenger fees were taxes, not regulations, and Marshall had clearly stated in Gibbons that the states retained not only the police power but the tax power as well.
The third argument, joined this time by Daniel, was that the commerce power itself was not exclusive;2 -5 five of the nine Justices nation that he had completely reversed the position he had taken in the License Cases only two years before. were now firmly on record against exclusivity, but unfortunately not all in the same case.
226
The dissenters' final argument that the transportation of passengers fell entirely outside the commerce clause 227 contradicted the holding of Gibbons. It also demonstrated the inconsistency of McLean, who had said in Groves that Mississippi could exclude slaves because people were not articles of commerce,2 8 and it served Marshall right for not clearly stating, when he had sustained federal power to license steamboats, that the vessels in question carried only passengers. 229 Catron and Grier, the two members of the majority who did not invoke the commerce clause, found at least four other grounds for striking down the passenger taxes, and each joined the other's opinion. 230 Catron argued that the state laws conflicted both with federal statutes and with treaties: by exempting personal baggage from import duties Congress had effectively given its owners a right to enter for nothing, and a treaty explicitly guaranteed British subjects free entry. 23 1 As Daniel noted on behalf of the dissenters, the exemption seemed to prove only that Congress had decided to lay no federal tax on baggage, and both of Catron's arguments seemed to contradict the state's admitted power to exclude the indigent or diseased. 232 Nevertheless, Justice Wayne seems correct that every Justice in the majority agreed that the statute and treaty superseded state power, 233 it was quite superfluous for three of them to add that the commerce clause did too.
More inventive and less contrived than any of the foregoing objections was Justice Grier's position that the passenger fees were in effect tonnage and import duties forbidden by article I, section l. 234 In form the tax lay neither on the vessel nor on imported goods, and, as the dissenters pointed out, the term "imports" could hardly apply to passengers arriving of their own free will. 235 Griefs point, however, was that the state could not tax either the ship or the passengers' baggage by indirection: making the captain pay for each passenger was just another way of scaling his liability to the size of the ship. This seems to have been the majority's best argument, but the dissenters did not dignify it with a reply. 236 Not content to have enunciated five. distinct grounds for their conclusion, the majority Justices embellished their opinions with four others that were so transparently flimsy that I have relegated them to a footnote. 237 The upshot was almost total incoherence. Unlike its predecessors, the Taney Court certainly could not be accused of deciding major constitutional cases without writing sufficiently lengthy opinions. Rather, it buried the unhappy reader in a torrent of verbiage: the Justices had written over one hundred pages of opinions in the License Cases and nearly two hundred in the Passenger Cases without providing any meaningful guidance for future controversies. this point by reference to the distinction between "Importation" and "Migration" of persons in the slave-trade clause of article 1, § 9, but they had to deny that "Migration" in this clause applied to free persons, lest it imply that passenger traffic was commerce. U.S. Within a few months of his appointment Curtis would conjure up out of the morass a solid majority for a brand new commerce clause interpretation that would dominate decisions for nearly a century. 240 The occasion was an action by the wardens of the port of Philadelphia to recover half the prescribed pilotage fee as a penalty for the departure of two ships without local pilots. The acknowledged power of a State to regulate its police, its domestic trade, and to govern its own citizens, may enable it to legislate on this subject, to a considerable extent; and the adoption of its system by Congress, and the application of it to the whole subject of commerce, does not seem to the Court to imply a right in the States so to apply it of their own authority. The offenders' counsel argued in Cooley that the fee supported "decayed" or "superannuated" pilots, making it not a police regulation but a tax analogous to that in the Passenger Cases. Cooley, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 302, 308 (Messrs. Morris and Tyson). But the fees were assessed only on sustain on the basis of precedent. 248 Curtis's reasoning, however, was a bolt out of the blue. Ignoring Marshall's treatment of the analogous quarantine laws, Curtis frankly acknowledged that the pilotage law was a regulation of commerce: the Court had already held navigation was commerce, 249 and the pilots' job was navigation. 250 By calling the pilotage law a commercial regulation, Curtis appeared either to reject Marshall's metaphysical police power distinction altogether or to resuscitate Story's repudiated view that form rather than purpose was controlling; 25 ' yet he acknowledged neither that his approach was new nor that the police power had ever played a part in the Court's decisions. 252 Indeed, in best Marshall fashion, Curtis barely acknowledged that there had been any earlier decisions. Correctly observing that prior cases had not decided whether the federal commerce power was exclusive, 25 3 Curtis cited none of them and treated the question as one of first impression:
those who disobeyed the law, see id at 311-12, thus clearly promoting safety by encouraging compliance; and surely the police power included, as in Milm and the License Cases, the authority to punish offenders.
. 248 20-33, 17788, 203-08, 215-18, 230-36 . Surprisingly, Curtis's statement provoked no challenge by any of the three Justices (Wayne, Taney, and Daniel) who had stoutly maintained in the Passenger Cases only three years before that the issue was already settled. See supra notes 214, 226 and accompanying text. Now the power to regulate commerce, embraces a vast field, containing not only many, but exceedingly various subjects, quite unlike in their nature; some imperatively demanding a single uniform rule, operating equally on the commerce of the United States in every port; and some, like the subject now in question, as imperatively demanding that diversity, which alone can meet the local necessities of navigation.
.. . Whatever subjects of this power are in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress. That this cannot be affirmed of laws for the regulation of pilots and pilotage is plain. The act of 1789 contains a clear and authoritative declaration by the first Congress, that the nature of this subject is such, that until Congress should find it necessary to exert its power, it should be left to the legislation of the States; that it is local and not national; that it is likely to be the best provided for, not by one system, or plan of regulations, but by as many as the legislative discretion of the several States should deem applicable to the local peculiarities of the ports within their limits.
254
This was a revolution. Curtis's interpretation was contrary to that formally embraced in previous cases by every one of his brethren except Grier, 255 yet three of these Justices acquiesced without a murmur. 2 5 6 Of course the result in Cooley did not conflict with the theory of fully concurrent authority that these three had earlier announced, and scholars have speculated that they joined the opinion either out of a lack of interest in Curtis's "incidental remarks" ' ' 7 or "as a barrier to the adoption of a more rigid formula."
' 'z 8 The impression remains, however, of a statesmanlike compromise designed to bring order out of chaos, and of most remarkable leadership by a Justice who had barely had time to slip into his robe. Whether Curtis's interpretation was convincing is another story. The words of the clause cut against him: the simple grant of authority to regulate commerce might or might not imply exclusivity, but it cer- the words used in the constitution ... are so very general and extensive, that they might be construed to cover a vast field of legislation, part of which has always been occupied by State laws; and, therefore .... the power should be considered as exclusively vested in congress, so far, and so far only, as the nature of the power requires). 256. Taney, Catron, and Nelson silently joined Curtis's opinion. The formerly uncommitted Grier was the fifth Justice to join the opinion.
257. 5 C. SWISHER, supra note 3, at 406. 258. F. FRANKFURTER, supra note 201, at 56-58.
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HeinOnline --1983 Duke L.J. 508 1983 tainly seemed to treat the subject as unitary. 259 Moreover, though the degree of need for uniformity was obviously relevant to the Framers' ostensible purpose of preventing undue obstructions to commerce, 260 the clause appeared to empower Congress rather than the Court to make the determination. Indeed, Curtis made no effort to reconcile his conclusion with either the text or the purpose of article I. Instead, borrowing another page from Marshall, he simply took it for granted that the Framers had done the right thing. Marshall had said the Court could ignore unconstitutional legislation and review state court judgments because reasonable Framers would have so provided; 261 Curtis said the commerce power was exclusive only when it ought to be. Curtis also failed to explain how the Court was supposed to determine whether or not a need for uniformity existed, 262 and his application of the new criterion to the case before him left something to be desired. The "local peculiarities" of various ports seemed to require only local pilots, not a plethora of different rules to confuse the traveler. 2 6 3 Curtis's only other argument was that Congress had thought diversity preferable, and he had already gone out of his way to argue that Congress' approval of state laws was not decisive:
If the law of Pennsylvania, now in question, had been in existence at the date of this act of Congress, we might hold it to have been adopted by Congress, and thus made a law of the United States, and so valid.[ 2 6 41 . . .
But the law on which these actions are founded was not enacted till 1803....
259.
In this respect Marshall's police power distinction was more satisfactory; there was a certain linguistic persuasiveness in arguing that the only power denied the states was that given to Congress. 262. See R. NEWMYEt, supra note 36, at 107 ("the significant feature of the decision was not the formulation of a definitive doctrine but the court's tacit agreement to stop looking for one"). For a discussion of the ambiguity of the test, see T. PoWEL, supra note 201, at 153-55.
263. Fifty years after Cooley, in holding that the admiralty clause of article III deprived a state of power to make a foreign vessel liable for supplies furnished to an independent contractor, the Court would stress the inability of the master "to acquaint himself with the laws of each individual State he may visit." The Roanoke, 189 U.S. 185, 195 (1903 
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If the Constitution excluded the states from making any law regulating commerce, certainly Congress cannot re-grant, or in any manner re-convey to the states that power. 265 Whether the commerce clause flatly "excluded the states from making any law" on the subject was, however, the very question in issue. That the clause might have an implicit restraining effect on the states did not compel the conclusion that the restraint was as absolute as the explicit bar on coining money. 266 The language of the clause made more persuasive an analogy to the clauses forbidding state imposts, wars, and compacts "without the Consent of [the] Congress" 267 : even if the Court must guard the federal interest in uniformity in the numerous cases Congiess might have difficulty anticipating, the Framers still seem to have vested ultimate trust in Congress to determine the extent of free commerce. 268 In other words, a decision to allow state regulation of commerce may itself be a regulation of commerce, and the contrary view taken in Cooley has not survived.
269
Taken by itself, Cooley may appear arbitrary, conclusory, and irreconcilable with the constitutional text. Nevertheless, anyone who has slogged through the Augean agglomeration preceding Curtis's labors must find them scarcely less impressive than those of the old stablecleaner himself.
E. Epilogue.
In doctrinal terms Cooley began a new era, but practically speaking it concluded the Taney Court's pronouncements on the negative effect of the commerce clause. The Court decided a number of additional cases with commerce clause overtones during Taney's twelve remaining years, but not one of them squarely faced the question whether Congress' power was exclusive, and not one so much as cited Cooley.
Several of the decisions upholding state authority rested at least in part on the reasonable conclusion that the activity in question was not "commerce" at all. A tax on negotiable instruments or other property was not one on commerce even though the articles might later be sent . At the end of his opinion in Sinnot Nelson conceded that quarantine laws had been upheld except when "in conflict... with the act of Congress." Id at 244. He made no effort to "how why the registration law conflicted with the license if a quarantine did not. Later decisions, applicability was debatable. 279 A tax on gold shipped from California to New York was struck down on the basis of article I, section 10280 without discussion of the crucial question whether the ban on export taxes in that section applied to interstate as well as to foreign shipments. 28 ' And in Hays v. PacFc Mail Steamshiv Co. 282 the Court invalidated a California property tax on out-of-state vessels without even identifying the provision on which it relied. 283 In sum, Cooley's dictum finally established that the commerce clause sometimes limited state power. When Taney died in 1864, how- 279. Taney argued in dissent that such compacts have "always been construed to mean nothing more than the river shall be as free to the citizens or subjects for which the other party contracts, as it is to the citizens or subjects of the State in which it is situated. could every other state they touched. Finally, "the admiralty law" recognized many distinctions between local and foreign vessels, and California had no jurisdiction over these vessels for the purpose of taxation; they were not, properly, abiding within its limits, so as to become incorporated with the other personal property of the State; they were there but temporarily, engaged in lawful trade and commerce with their sita at the home port, where the vessels belonged, and where the owners were liable to be taxed for the capital invested, and where the taxes had been paid. Id at 599-600. Daniel's dissent relied on an unexplained lack of jurisdiction to hear the case. Id at 600.
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CONCLUSION
The three 1837 decisions upholding state authority created a false impression. Later decisions revealed that the Court under Taney was prepared to act vigorously to protect both contracts and commerce from state interference, and that in Taney, Story, Curtis, and Thompson the period had its share of strong Justices. Both these strengths and the Court's general affinity for Marshall's nationalistic views were confirmed, moreover, by decisions in other areas. Those decisions will be considered in the next issue of the Duke Law Journal.
